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Biologists  and  economists  have  analyzed  populations  where  each  individual 
interacts  with  randomly  selected  individuals.  The  random  matching  generates  a 
very complicated  stochastic  system. Consequently  biologists  and  economists  have 
approximated  such  a system with  a deterministic  system. The  justitication  for  such 
an  approximation  is that  the  population  is assumed  to  be  very large  and  thus some 
law  of large  numbers  must  hold.  This  paper  gives  a characterization  of random 
matching  schemes for  countably  infinite  populations.  In  particular  this paper  shows 
that  there  exists a random  matching  scheme such that  the  stochastic system and  the 
deterministic  system are  the  same. Journal  of Economic  Literature  Classification 
Numbers:  026,  213.  161  1992  Academic  Press,  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
There  is  a  large  literature  in  economics,  evolutionary  biology,  and 
population  genetics  that  studies  dynamical  systems  with  individuals 
randomly  matched  in  pairs,  although  the  particular  way  in  which  people 
are  matched  is left  unspecified.  In  this  paper  we describe  ways of matching 
individuals  and  the  properties  of  such  matching  schemes.  We  first  give 
some  examples  in  economics  and  biology  where  random  matching  occurs. 
Gale  [13]  considers  a  market  that  contains  a  large  number  of 
individuals  who  meet  randomly  in  pairs.  Agents  are  characterized  by  their 
history,  which  includes  the  initial  endowments  and  utility  function.  When 
individuals  meet,  they  bargain  over  the  terms  of trade.  Gale  assumes  that 
the  matching  scheme  is  such  that  the  probability  with  which  an  individual 
meets  an  individual  with  a  particular  history  equals  the  proportion  of the 
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population  with  that  particular  history.  Furthermore,  Gale  assumes  that 
the  distribution  of  histories  does  not  depend  on  which  individuals  were 
matched  in  the  previous  periods.  Gale  goes  on  to  characterize  the 
equilibrium  strategies. 
Fudenberg  and  Levine  [lo]  examine  a model  where there  are  n popula- 
tions;  each  population  consists  of  m  different  types,  where  each  type  is 
defined  by  a  belief  over  which  strategy  the  other  individuals  adopt.  The 
proportion  of population  i  that  is of type j  is denoted  by pii.  Every  period 
each  player  from  a  population  i  is  randomly  and  independently  matched 
with  one  individual  from  every  other  population  i’  (i’  #  i).  Fudenberg  and 
Levine  assume  that  the  probability  with  which  a player  meets  a player  from 
population  i’  and  of type  j  is pi?.  The  randomly  matched  individuals  play 
a  game  selecting  strategies  according  to  their  beliefs  and  updating  their 
beliefs  according  to  the  observed  strategy  choices  of  the  other  players. 
Fudenberg  and  Levine  go  on  to  characterize  the  steady  states  of  this 
dynamic  system. 
These  models  are  very  similar  to  the  models  that  have  been  studied 
extensively  in  population  genetics.  ’  In  a  common  formulation  of  these 
models,  the  phenotype  (e.g.,  eye color)  is  determined  by  the  action  of two 
genes  at  one  locus.  Genes  are  assumed  to  be  of two  types  (alleles):  A,  and 
A,.  Individuals  are  of  three  types  (genotypes):  A,A,,  A,A,,  and  A,A,. 
When  two  individuals  mate  they  each produce  gametes  (reproductive  cells). 
Gametes  receive  one  of the  parent’s  genes. An  offspring  is  produced  by  the 
union  of a gamete  from  each  parent.  When  two  individuals  of types  au’  and 
bb’  mate  they  produce  offspring  of type  ab,  ab’,  a’b,  and  a’b’  with  equal 
probability.  Another  assumption  describes  which  individuals  mate. 
“Matings  take  place  at  random  with  respect  to  the  genetic  differences  being 
considered  and  in  a  population  of  infinite  size”  [4,  p. 451.  All  individuals 
mate  at  the  same  time  and  then  are  completely  replaced  by  their  offspring. 
Thus  the  dynamics  of  the  process  depends  on  the  random  matching  of 
individuals  and  the  random  selection  of  genotypes  for  the  offspring. 
Suppose  there  is  a  large  population  and  the  initial  relative  frequency  of 
alleles  A,  and  A,  in  the  population  is p1  and  pz  (pl  +p2  =  1).  Then  the 
Hardy-Weinberg  theorem  states  that  in  the  next  period  the  relative 
frequency  of the  genotypes  A,A,,  A,A,,  A,A,  is  respectively  p:,  2p,p,, 
and  pi.  This  theorem  is “proved”  (just  as in  the  original  papers  by  Hardy 
[ 163  and  Weinberg  [31])  by  computing  the  expected  proportion  with 
which  each  of  the  matches  occurs.  No  explicit  modeling  of  the  matching 
scheme  and  no  derivation  of a  law of large  numbers  is given.  Furthermore 
there  seems  to  be  some  confusion  in  the  literature  about  whether  the 
’ This  similarity  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  large  literature  on  the  application  of 
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population  needs  to  be  infinite  or  very  large.  Feller  [S,  p.  1353  writes:  “In 
a large  population  the  actually  observed  frequencies  of the  three  genotypes 
in  the  filial  generation  will  be close  to  the  theoretical  probabilities.”  And  in 
a  footnote  at  the  end  of this  sentence:  “The  statement  is  made  precise  by 
the  law of large  numbers  and  the  central  limit  theorem,  which  permits  us 
to  estimate  the  effect of chance  fluctuations.”  Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [ 171 
write:  “A  few more  premises  were  used  implicitly  in  the  derivation.  For 
instance  we equated  “frequency”  with  “probability.”  This  is  admissible  in 
the  limiting  case  of  very  large  populations”  [page  91.  The  model  just 
described  is  generalized  to  the  case where  genotypes  differ  in  fitness  (the 
expected  number  of offspring)  and  thus  where  the  number  of a  particular 
allele  changes  with  time. 
Thus,  underlying  the  models  by  Fudenberg  and  Levine  as well  as  the 
biological  models  is  the  conjecture  that  if  the  population  is  very  large 
(possibly  infinite)  there  exists  a  matching  scheme  such  that  the  proportion 
of  matches  involving  individuals  of  two  particular  types  is  equal  to  the 
expected  number  of such  matches  when  all  matches  are  equally  likely.  In 
the  model  by  Fudenberg  and  Levine  and  in  the  biological  models,  the 
matching  scheme  is  implemented  repeatedly  and  each  individual’s  type  is 
allowed  to  change  between  periods.  Then  the  individuals  follow  a 
stochastic  process  governed  by  the  way  types  are  updated  and  by  the 
matching  rule.  Again,  the  models  are  analyzed  as  deterministic  systems. 
The  law of motion  is  computed  by  assuming  that  in  every  period  the  set 
of  individuals  adopting  the  same  strategy  is  matched  with  the  population 
average.  Thus  there  is  an  implicit  conjecture  that  if the  population  is large 
enough,  there  exists  a  matching  rule  that  matches  individuals  in  every 
period  in  such  a  way  that  the  deterministic  process  provides  a  good 
description  of the  stochastic  process. 
This  paper  proves  that  there  is  a  random  matching  rule  such  that  the 
deterministic  process  is  equivalent  to  the  stochastic  process  when 
individuals  are  represented  by  the  set of natural  numbers.  Thus  this  paper 
answers  the  following  questions  that  are  usually  left  unanswered  in  the 
literature:  How  is  the  population  characterized?  What  is  the  structure  of 
the  matching  process?  How  are types  assigned  to  individuals?  What  do  we 
mean  by  each  subpopulation  facing  the  distribution  of types  equal  to  the 
population  distribution?  How  do  we  characterize  the  evolution  of  the 
population  from  the  random  matching  scheme? 
The  problem  analyzed  in  this  paper  is  similar  to  the  problem  of whether 
idiosyncratic  risk  disappears  in  large  populations.  If  the  population  is taken 
to  be  the  natural  numbers  and  individuals’  risk  are  i.i.d.,  then  the  popula- 
tion  as  a  whole  does  not  face  idiosyncratic  risk.  Feldman  and  Gilles  [7] 
and  Judd  [ 181  point  out  that  this  result  does  not  necessarily  extend  to  the 
case where the  population  is taken  to  be the  unit  interval.  Let  Xi  be the  risk 476  RICHARD  T.  BOYLAN 
faced  by  individual  i and  let  X=  (Xi)is  rO,,,  be a collection  of i.i.d.  random 
variables  that  have  finite  mean  and  finite  variance.  Then  it  can  be  shown 
[19,  p.  lo]  that  there  does  not  exist  a  measurable  process  equivalent 
to  X,  and  thus  the  integral  of  X  does  not  converge  (almost  surely)  to  its 
expectation.  * 
The  discussion  of the  risk  problems  leads  us to  think  that  analyzing  ran- 
dom  matching  in  a  countable  population  is  easier  than  analyzing  random 
matching  when  the  population  is  the  unit  interval.  Furthermore,  in  the 
models  of  risk  analyzed,  the  event  that  individual  i is  in  an  accident  does 
not  affect the  probability  that  individualj  is in  an accident,  while  in  match- 
ing  models,  if individual  i is matched  to  individual  i,  then  individual  i  has 
to  be  matched  to  individual  i.  Thus,  the  problem  of  randomly  matching 
individuals  seems harder  than  the  problem  of randomly  assigning  accidents 
to  individuals.  Consequently,  it  seems more  likely  that  useful  results  can  be 
generated  in  the  countable  population  model  than  in  the  continuum 
population  model. 
Section  2  gives  an  example  of how the  dynamics  for  a very  large  popula- 
tion  differs  from  the  dynamics  for  an  infinite  population.  Section  3 
describes  the  problem  of finding  a matching  technology  for  infinite  popula- 
tions  such  that  all  matches  are  equally  likely.  Section  4 describes  the  main 
results  of this  paper.  Section  5  proves  the  first  conjecture;  i.e.,  that  there  is 
a  matching  scheme  such  that  a  law of large  numbers  holds.  Sections  6,  7, 
8.3  prove  the  second  conjecture;  i.e.,  that  there  exists  a  random  matching 
scheme  such  that  the  law  of  large  numbers  holds  when  individuals  are 
matched  infinitely  many  times.  Section  8.2  proves  that  the  deterministic 
process  provides  a  good  approximation  for  the  evolution  of  a  finite  (but 
large  enough)  population,  for  a finite  number  of periods. 
2.  MATCHES  OVER  VERY  LARGE  POPULATIONS 
A  natural  argument  for  supporting  the  conjecture  in  the  introduction  is 
the  following:  if  the  population  is  of  size  n  then  the  probability  that  the 
matching  rule  does not  behave  as its  expectation  is q(n). By  the  law of large 
numbers  q(n)  can  be  made  arbitrarily  small  by  taking  n  large.  In  other 
words  for  large  populations  the  conjecture  is approximately  correct.  As we 
will  see in  Section  8.2  this  argument  can  be  formalized  if  the  matching 
scheme  occurs  finitely  many  times.  In  many  cases analyzed  in  the  literature, 
however,  the  matching  scheme  analyzed  occurs  infinitely  many  times,  and 
it  is  thus  possible  that  the  small  perturbations  that  occur  in  each  period 
2 However  we  can  get  &-convergence  (see  Uhlig  [29]).  Another  way around  the  problem 
is  to  index  individuals  by elements  of an  abstract  nonatomic  probability  space  (see Green 
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alter  the  process  significantly  in  the  limit.  We  construct  an  example  where 
this  problem  actually  occurs.  The  example  is  taken  from  evolutionary 
biology  because  (i)  such  models  are  very  important  in  evolutionary 
biology,  (ii)  several  economists  have  applied  evolutionary  models  to  game 
theory,  and  (iii)  the  mathematics  in  this  example  are  very  tractable. 
Suppose  that  there  is  a  population  consisting  of  3M  individuals,  where 
M  is  an  even  number.  Individuals  have  a  very  simple  life:  an  individual 
born  at  time  t interacts  with  one  randomly  selected  individual,  then  at  time 
t +  1 gives  birth  to  new individuals  and  dies.  The  matching  scheme  is  left 
unspecified  but  we assume  that  the  same  random  matching  scheme  is used 
in  each  period  and  that  in  each  period  all  matches  can  occur  with  positive 
probability.  3  Individuals  are  of  three  different  types:  sl,  s2,  s3.  If  an 
individual  of  type  s,  interacts  with  an  individual  of  type  s,  then  the 
$,-individual  has  urr, offspring  while  the  s,-individual  has  aar offspring.  All 
offspring  are  of  the  same  type  as  the  parent.  Suppose  that  the  matrix 
A =  (a,,.)  is  as follows: 
1  2  0 
A=  0  1  2. 
i  1  2  0  1 
First  note  that  the  population  size stays  constant:  if  individuals  of type 
s, and  s,. meet  they  will  have  together  2 =  uUw  +  a,,,  offspring  and  thus  keep 
the  population  size constant.  Note  also  that,  because  of the  0 entry  in  the 
matrix  A,  at  any  period  t,  there  is  a  positive  probability  that  one  of the 
types  disappears,  which  we denote  by  q:.  For  any  population  distribution 
among  types  (M,,  M,,  M,),  where  M,  +  M,  +  M,  =  3M,  there  exists  a set 
of matches  for  which  one  of the  types  totally  disappears.  Since  all  matches 
are  possible  these  matches  will  have  positive  probability.  Denote  the 
probability  that  one  type  disappears  when  the  population  distribution  is 
(Mt,  MzT  M3)  by  qM,.M2.M,.  Let 
qe  =  min 
iMl+Mz+M,=3M} 
qM,.Mz,M,. 
Then,  for  all  t,  q:aqp>O. 
Note  that  if a  type  disappears,  it  never  comes  back.  Consequently,  if the 
matching  scheme  is  repeated  infinitely  often,  the  probability  that  at  least 
one  of the  three  types  will  disappear  is at  least 
1-  lim  (1 -qe)‘=  1. 
, -  ,m 
3 One  way  of  describing  the  random  matching  scheme  is  to  think  of  individuals  as  being 
drawn  successively  (without  replacement)  from  an  urn.  The  first  and  second  individuals  drawn 
are  matched  together,  the  third  and  fourth  individuals  drawn  are  matched  together,  and  so 
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Let  B,  be  the  set  of events  for  which  one  of the  types  disappears  by  time 
t.  From  the  previous  remarks  {B,}  is  an  increasing  sequence  and 
lim,,,  P(B,)  =  1; therefore  one  of the  types  disappears  in  finite  time.  It  is 
easy to  see that  if type  s,  disappears,  then  the  population  will  converge  to 
a population  composed  uniquely  of individuals  of type  s, + I Cmod  3) (almost 
surely).  Therefore  the  population  will  converge  to  one  of the  vertices  of the 
simplex  in  finite  time  (almost  surely).  Since  this  result  is true  irrespective  of 
the  population  size 3M,  it  will  also  be  true  as M  tends  to  infinity. 
In  evolutionary  biology  the  evolution  for  the  population  is approximated 
by  the  replicator  model.  The  replicator  model  assumes  that  a  proportion 
2p,p,  of the  matches  are  between  individuals  of type  s,  and  s,,  where  pc 
is  the  proportion  of the  population  of type  s,.  Then  the  proportion  of the 
population  of  type  i  at  time  f+  1 is  related  to  the  population  at  time  t  in 
the  following  way: 
p;’  ’ = R,(p’)  =  p:  c,  P:ar” 
c,  cm. PtaWP:, 
Biologists  are  interested  in  the  behavior  of  the  system  as times  goes  to 
infinity  (see  [21]).  We  already  know  the  limit  behavior  of  the  stochastic 
process  for  the  matrix  considered  above.  Next  we  characterize  the 
dynamics  of the  replicator  model  for  the  same  matrix.  We  are  particularly 
interested  in  whether  the  replicator  model  gives  a good  approximation  of 
the  evolution  of a  large  population.  First  suppose  that  the  initial  popula- 
tion  is  composed  of a third  of each  type.  Then  the  population  will  remain 
at  the  barycenter,  contrary  to  the  behavior  of the  stochastic  process.  The 
next  proposition  (which  is  proven  in  the  Appendix)  characterizes  the 
limiting  population  when  the  system  does  not  start  at  the  barycenter. 
PROPOSITION  1.  Suppose the  initial  population  is in  the  interior  of  the 
simplex  and is not  at  the barycenter.  Then the set of  accumulation points of 
the  trajectory  is a  subset of  the  boundary  which  contains the  vertices and 
infinitely  many points. 
Thus  for  any  period  T,  there  is a period  t >  T such  that  p’ is far removed 
from  any  of  the  vertices,  and  we  conclude  that  the  deterministic 
approximation  does  not  give  a  very  good  approximation  of the  stochastic 
process. 
In  most  of  the  literature,  the  evolution  of  the  population  is  studied 
through  a continuous  approximation  of (1).  Since DYNAMICALSYSTEMSANDRANDOMMATCHING 
it  is  claimed  that  the  discrete  process  can  be  replaced  by 
equation, 
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the  differential 
dp,- 
dt  -  pr 
( 
C  pvarc  -C  C  puavw.pw. 
L  t’  II  > 
(see for  instance  [30]).  For  the  matrix  considered  above,  it  can  be  shown 
(see [32])  that  the  trajectories  of the  continuous  approximation  are  simple 
closed  curves  going  through  the  initial  population.  The  behavior  of  the 
continuous  approximation  is thus  different  from  the  stochastic  process  and 
the  discrete  deterministic  process. 
3.  MATCHES  OVER  COUNTABLY  INFINITE  NUMBER  OF  AGENTS 
This  section  introduces  the  notation  that  will  be  used  in  this  paper  and 
discusses the  problems  of finding  a random  matching  scheme  for  an  infinite 
population.  We  assume  that  the  population  is  countably  infinite  and  is 
denoted  by 
N=  { 1, 2, .  .  .  . n, .  ..}. 
Each  individual  is  matched  anonymously  to  exactly  one  other  individual. 
There  are  m  types  of individuals.  We  keep  the  terminology  vague  so that 
the  discussion  applies  to  economics  (where  types  are beliefs,  preferences,  or 
endowments),  evolutionary  biology  (where  types  are  strategies),  and  to 
population  genetics  (where  types  are  genotypes  or  alleles).  The  set of types 
is denoted  by  S,  where 
s=  {Sl)  .  ..) s,}. 
For  convenience  we represent  the  set of types  by  the  standard  basis for  R”; 
i.e.,  s,  is  the  m  dimensional  vector  with  a  one  on  the  rth  component  and 
zeros  on  the  other  components.  Let  a:  N  +  S  be  such  that 
li-mli+,i  a(i)=p. 
z=l 
If  a(i)  =  s, then  individual  i  is  of type  s,.  The  uth  component  of the  vector 
p, p”,  represents  the  proportion  of the  population  of type  s,.  We  assume 
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Let  ,Z be  the  set of all  possible  pairwise  matchings;  i.e., 
C =  { 0: N  +  N  1~7  is bijective  and  for  all  i,  a’(i)  =  i and  cr(i) #  i}.  4 
A  few remarks  on  the  conditions  that  characterize  C.  The  first  condition 
says  that  each  individual  is  matched  exactly  once.  The  second  condition 
says that  “if  John  is  matched  with  Paul  then  Paul  is  matched  with  John.” 
The  third  condition  states that  an  individual  cannot  be matched  to  himself. 
A  random  matching  scheme  is  then  a probability  space  (C, 9,  P),  where  9 
is  a  a-algebra  of  subsets  of C  and  P  is  a  countably  additive  probability 
measure. 
We  first  show  that  there  does  not  exist  a  probability  space  (C,  8,  P) 
such  that  for  all  distinct  players  i, j,  kE  N,  the  event  that  player  i  is 
matched  with  player  j  and  the  event  that  player  i  is  matched  with  player 
k  are  equally  likely.  Suppose  that  (Z,  F,  P)  is  such  a  probability  space. 
Denote  the  probability  that  player  i is matched  with  player  j  by 
In  order  for  qj to  be  well  defined  we need  to  assume  that  for  all  individuals 
i,jEN, 
{aEZIa(i)=j}EK  (2) 
Suppose  that  for  i # j,  qj =  q >  0.  Note  that  since  each  individual  is 
matched  once,  the  sets  { ~7  E C 1  a(i)  =  j}  and  { cr  EC  1  o(i)  =  k}  are  disjoint. 
Thus 
P(o(i)  E N)  =  P (  LJ  m=i) 
/~N\fil 
=jEg(,)  P(~(i)=~~=,s~l,i  4=  00. 
This  clearly  contradicts  the  definition  of  a  probability.  Alternatively,  if 
q =  0  then  P(a(i)  E N)  =  0  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  fact  that 
individual  i  is  matched  once. 
4 The  use  of  the  symbol,  0,  in  this  paper  follows  Algebra,  where  a  permutation  is  denoted 
by  o.  Gilboa  and  Matsui  [14]  use  a  much  bigger  matching  space  when  examining  the 
problem  of  matching  two  different  populations.  They  detine  the  set  of  matchings  to  be  6’ 
where 
Q={o:N+[O,  l)xNxN}. 
The  interpretation  is  as  follows.  There  are  a  countable  number  of  matches  labeled 
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Clearly  the  assumption  in  Eq.  (2)  and  the  assumption  that  all  matches 
are  equally  likely  lead  to  this  contradiction.  In  order  to  weaken  the  set of 
measurable  sets  we need  to  find  another  way  to  express  the  idea  that  all 
matches  are  equally  likely.  Alternatively,  we can  relax  the  assumption  that 
all  matches  are  equally  likely. 
4.  SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS 
4.1.  A  Characterization  of  Random  Matching  Schemes 
There  are live  conditions  on  the  random  matching  scheme  (C,  9,  P)  that 
we consider.  Condition  I  states  that  for  all  individual  i, j,  k,  the  probability 
with  which  individual  i is matched  with  individual  j  equals  the  probability 
with  which  individual  i is  matched  with  individual  k.  Condition  II  states 
that  the  probability  with  which  individual  i is matched  with  an  individual 
of type  s, equals  the  proportion  of the  population  of type  s,,  pr.  Condition 
III  states  that,  with  probability  1  and  for  Y  #  u,  the  proportion  of  the 
population  of type  s,  that  is  matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,  equals 
2p,p,.  ’  Condition  IV,  which  is implied  by  condition  III,  states  that  for  any 
E >  0  and  for  any  6 >O,  if  the  population  is  large  enough  then  with 
probability  greater  than  1 -  6  the  proportion  of the  population  of type  s, 
that  is matched  with  an individual  of type  s, is within  E of p,pu.  Condition  V 
states  that  the  random  matching  scheme  does  not  depend  on  the 
individuals’  types.  Formally, 
I.  For  all  iEN,j,  keN\i,  P[a(i)=j]=P[a(i)=k]. 
II.  For  all  iEN,  S,E S,  P[a(a(i))  =s,]  =  p,. 
III.  (SLLN)  For  all  r #  v,  (l/n)  C:=,  a,(i)  cc,(a(i))  converges  almost 
surely  to  p,p,.’ 
IV.  (WLLN)  For  all  r#o,  (l/n)Cycl  x,(i)  cl,(a(i))  converges  in 
probability  to  pr  p,. 
V.  The  random  matching  scheme  (C,  F-,  P)  does  not  depend  on  the 
assignment  of types  CI. 
We  showed  in  the  previous  section  that  condition  I  cannot  be  satisfied. 
Are  there  matching  schemes  that  satisfy  the  remaining  conditions,  or  at 
least  a  subset  of those? 
’ The  “2”  is missing  from  condition  III  because  the  expression  is asymmetric  in  r  and  u. 
6 Note  that  since  the  probability  is countable  additive,  if condition  I  holds,  this  condition 
can  be  replaced  by the  condition  that  the  random  variables  {a(cr(i))}  are  indepeildent.  This 
is not  true  if the  probability  measure  is only finitely  additive  (see  [25]). 
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PROPOSITION  2.  There  exists  a  matching  scheme for  which  Condition  II 
and  Condition  ZZZ  are  satisfied. 
This  proposition  corresponds  to  Theorem  3  in  Section  5.  The  random 
matching  scheme  works  as follows.  (i)  Each  individual  rolls  an m-sided  dice 
where  the  probability  that  the  outcome  is  s,  is  p,.  (ii)  Suppose  the  nth 
individual  is  of type  s, and  rolls  an  s,,  where  r #  u. Suppose  there  exists  an 
individual  in  the  population  ( 1, .  .  .  . n -  1 }  who  is of type  s,,  has  rolled  an 
s,,  and  has  yet  to  be  paired.  If  there  are  several  individuals  that  satisfy 
these  conditions,  pick  the  individual  represented  by  the  lowest  integer  and 
match  this  individual  to  n. (iii)  Suppose  the  nth  individual  is of type  s, and 
rolls  an  s,.  Then  if there  exists  another  individual  of type  s,,  who  has rolled 
an  s,  and  who  is  not  paired  yet,  match  this  individual  to  n.  Figure  1 gives 
an  example  of  how  the  random  matching  works.  Clearly,  this  matching 
process  satisfies  condition  II.  By  the  strong  law  of  large  numbers  the 
matching  rule  satisfies  condition  III. 
PROPOSITION  3.  There  exists  a  matching  scheme for  which  condition  IV 
and  condition  V  are  satisfied. 
This  proposition  corresponds  to  Corollary  2  in  Section  8.  The  random 
matching  scheme  described  in  this  theorem  works  as follows.  We  put  the 
first  2  individuals  in  the  first  urn,  the  next  4 individuals  in  the  second  urn, 
the  next  18 individuals  in  the  third  urn,  and  so on.  Specifically,  let  k(n)  be 
the  number  of individuals  in  the  kth  urn,  where  k( 1) =  2,  4(n)  =  Cr=  1 k(i), 
and  k(n)  =  n#(n  -  1).  The  random  matching  is  generated  by  drawing 
individuals,  pairwise  and  without  replacement,  from  each  urn.  Figure  2 
gives  an  example  of how  the  random  matching  works. 
For  large  enough  urns  the  law of large  numbers  will  hold.  But  the  urns 
were formed  such  that  just  about  all  individuals  would  be placed  in  a large 
enough  urn.  Thus  the  law of large  numbers  holds  for  the  set of individuals 
as a  whole. 
PROPOSITION  4.  There  are  no  matching  schemes for  which  condition  II 
and  condition  V  hold. 
FIG.  1.  Illustration  of  the  random  matching  scheme  constructed  in  Proposition  1. DYNAMICAL  SYSTEMS  AND  RANDOM  MATCHING  483 
FIG.  2.  Illustration  of  the  random  matching  scheme  constructed  in  Proposition  2. 
Proof  Suppose  condition  II  holds.  Let 
a”(i)  = 
i 
s2  if  i<n 
a(i)  if  i>n. 
Let 
F”=  {a~C~c+(l))=~~} 
=  (~~C[3i>n  such  that  a(i)=sl  and  a(l)=i). 
Clearly,  F’  2  F=  1  . . . 3  F”  2  .  .  and  P(fi,  Fn)  =  0.  Then,  since 
lim,  +  m P( F”)  =  P(lim,  _ m F”),  for  n  large  enough,  P(F”)  <  pr.  Contra- 
diction.  1 
Note  that  the  existence  of  a  matching  scheme  can  be  thought  of  as a 
mechanism  design  problem.  Proposition  4  can  then  be  interpreted  as  the 
impossibility  of designing  a “fair”  mechanism  if the  designer  does not  know 
the  type  of all  individuals.  Gilboa  and  Matsui  [ 143  are  able  to  prove  the 
existence  of  a  finitely  additive  random  matching  scheme  that  satisfies 
condition  I.  However,  countable  additivity  seems necessary for  establishing 
condition  III  and  condition  IV. 
4.2.  A  Characterization  of  Repeated  Random  Matching  Schemes for  Infinite 
Populations 
Let  A  be  the  set  of  assignments  of types  in  the  population  that  have  a 
Cesaro  average;  i.e., 
aESNInlirnm  (l/n)  i  (‘)  a I  exists  and  is strictly  positive 
i=l 
Let  r:  S x S +  S  be  the  updating  rule;  i.e.,  an  individual  of  type  s, who  is 
matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,  becomes  a type  z(s,,  s,).  A  repeated 
random  matching  scheme  is  described  by  a  probability  space 
(C”  x A”,  Y,  Prob). 
Let  a’(i)  denote  the  type  of  individual  i  at  time  t.  If  TV’  E A,  then  p’ 
denotes  the  Cesaro  average  of  a’.  There  are  three  conditions  on  the 
repeated  random  matching  scheme  (Cc0 x A”,  9,  Prob)  that  we consider. 
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on  the  type  of the  individual  in  the  previous  period,  a’-  l(i),  and  the  type 
of  the  individual  that  was  matched  with  individual  i  at  time  t -  1, 
a’-  ‘(a’-  l(i)).  C on  itton  B  requires  that  the  probability  with  which  d’  . 
individual  i is matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,,  at  time  t,  is P:.  Condi- 
tion  C  states  that,  with  probability  1 and  for  r #  u,  the  proportion  of the 
population  of  type  s, that  is  matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,  equals 
2pfp:,  for  every  period  t.  Formally, 
A.  There  exists  a measurable  set G E 3  such  that  Prob(G)  =  1 and  for 
all  sequences  ((a’,  g’)}  EG,  cc’(i)=z[a’+‘(i),  a’-‘(a’-‘(i))]. 
B.  For  all  i,  s,,  t,  u’EA,  Prob[cr’(a’(i))  =s,Icl’]  =  p:. 
C.  There  exists  a measurable  set G E 9  such  that  Prob(G)  =  1 and  for 
all  {(a!,  o’)}  EG,  for  all  r #  u, for  all  t, lim,,,,  (l/n)  Cr=,  a:(i)  a:(a’(i))= 
P:P:,. 
The  next  proposition  is  a generalization  of Proposition  2. 
PROPOSITION  5.  There  exists  a  dynamical  random  matching  scheme  such 
that  conditions  A,  B,  and  C  hold. 
This  proposition  corresponds  to  Theorem  5 in  Section  7. At  each  period 
we use the  random  matching  scheme  defined  in  Proposition  1: since  there 
are  a countable  number  of periods  it  seems clear  that  Proposition  1 should 
imply  Proposition  4.  The  difftculty  resides  in  defining  the  probability 
space. ’  The  basic  steps in  the  proof  are the  following:  (i)  For  each  a E A  the 
matching  scheme  is  defined  as in  the  proof  of  Proposition  1. (ii)  Next  we 
define  a  matching  scheme  for  all  aESN\A,  (Z,  Fa2;,,  P,),  such  that 
(L’,  9*,  P,)  is  measurable  with  respect  to  all  a E SN.  The  crucial  result 
used  to  accomplish  this  is  the  Kuratowski-Ryll-Nordziewski  Theorem. 
(iii)  Then  we use the  Ionescu  Tulcea  theorem  to  define  a probability  space 
over  Z‘”  x (SN)co.  (iv)  The  rest  of  the  proof  consists  of  restricting  the 
probability  space  to  C”  x A”. 
4.3.  A  Characterization  of  Repeated  Random  Matching  Schemes  for  Finite 
Populations 
If  the  population  size is  N,  denote  the  population  by  P(N)  =  { 1, .  .  .  . N}, 
and  let  C,  be  the  set of all  possible  matches,  where 
Z,=  {u:  P(N)+  P(N)/  0  is bijective  and  for  all  i, o*(i)  =-i 
and  a(i)  #  i}. 
‘This  is  similar  to  the  fact  that  it  is  much  simpler  to  prove  the  law  of  large  numbers  for 
coin  tosses  (just  use  Chebychev’s  inequality)  than  proving  that  the  coin  tosses  come  from  a 
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Let  P,  be  the  probability  measure  over  EN  such  that  all  matches  are 
equally  likely;  i.e., 
IMI  ME2zN,  P,(M)=- 
ICNI. 
Note  that  the  matching  scheme  (C,,  2tN,  P,,,)  satisfies  condition  I  and 
condition  V.  For  any  T>  0,  define  the  T-repeated  random  matching 
scheme  (Z’,  2xT, P’),  where  2”r  is  the  product  a-algebra  and  PC  is  the 
product  measure. 
PROPOSITION  6.  Fix  a time period  T  and consider the stochastic process 
generated  by  the  law  of  motion  z  and  the  random  matching  scheme 
VT,  2  “T,  P’).  Then, for  N  large  enough (where N  depends  upon T),  the 
process  can be approximated  by  the deterministic process which is computed 
by  taking  the expected outcomes  in each period. 
This  proposition  is proved  in  Section  8.2. 
5.  CONSTRUCTION  OF  A  PROBABILITY  SPACE  OVER  MATCHES 
In  this  section  we construct  a  probability  space over  the  set of matches 
by  considering  the  events:  “the  set  of  matches  such  that  individual  i  is 
matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,.”  Let  SN  be  “the  set of realizations 
of matching  types;”  i.e.,  if x E SN,  then  x(i)  is the  type  of i’s match.  We  first 
define  a  probability  space  over  SN  by  requiring  that  the  probability  with 
which  an  individual  is  matched  with  an  individual  of a  particular  type  is 
equal  to  the  proportion  of the  population  of that  type.  Then  we show that 
this  probability  space  induces  a  probability  space  over  matches, 
(,X,92,  Pz).’  This  probability  space  is  the  (Pz)  unique  probability  space 
for  which  the  probability  with  which  an  individual  is  matched  to  an 
individual  of a  particular  type  is equal  to  the  population  average.  For  this 
probability  space each  event,  “individual  i is  matched  with  individual  j,”  is 
not  measurable.  If  we let  these  events  be measurable,  as in  the  probability 
space  (Z,  9:,  Pi),  then  these  events  are  not  equally  likely,  although  all 
individuals  have  the  same  probability  of being  matched  with  an  individual 
of type  s,  (for  all  s, E S). 
We  consider  each  element  in  SN  as the  realization  of an  infinite  sequence 
of i.i.d.  random  variables  where  the  probability  that  x(i)  equals  s,  is pv.  If 
m =  6 and  pO =  l/6  (for  v =  1, .  .  .  . 6)  we can  think  of x  as the  outcome  from 
rolling  a dice  infinitely  many  times.  Let  (,SN,  $3, cl) be the  probability  space 
8 Thus  calling  elements  in  SN  “ realizations  of matching  type”  is justified  since  they can  be 
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we just  described  where  ~?4  is  the  o-algebra  generated  by  the  finite  dimen- 
sional  rectangles,  and  p  is  the  extension  of  the  probability  over  the  finite 
dimensional  rectangles.  9 For  all  types  s,.  let  Z,(U)  c  N  be  the  subset  of the 
population  of type  3,;  i.e., 
Z,(a)=  (i~NIa(i)=s,}. 
Note  that  each  set  Z,(x)  is  infinite.  Let  X,,(a)  c  SN  be  the  set  of realiza- 
tions  of the  matching  process  such  that  the  proportion  of individuals  that 
are  of type  r and  are  matched  with  individuals  of type  u is p,pC;  i.e., 
X,,(a)=  xESN/Jimx  (l/T)  i  q(i)x,(i)=p,p, 
i  i=l  I 
Then  by  the  strong  law of large  numbers,  p(X,,(cr))  =  1. ‘*  Let  X,  be the  set 
of  realizations  of  the  matching  process  such  that  for  all  s,,  s, E S,  the 
proportion  of  individuals  that  are  of  type  Y  and  are  matched  with 
individuals  of type  u is p,p”  ; i.e.,  X,  =  fir  n,  X,,  (GI). Note  that  since  X,  is 
the  finite  intersection  of sets of measure  one,  p(X,)  =  1. 
For  all  x E X,  and  for  all  types  s,,  s,,  let  A:,  be  the  set of players  of type 
s, that  are  matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,;  i.e., 
AzL,-  {ieNIa(i)=s,,x(i)=s,}. 
Note  that  each  of  the  sets A;”  has  countably  infinite  many  elements  and 
thus  can  be  enumerated  as 
A$  =  (up”(l),  a;$),  ... ), 
9 Formally,  a  finite  dimensional  rectangle  is  a  set  of  the  form 
B=  jxeXJxiEB,  for  all  i  in  J} 
where  J  is  a  finite  subset  of  N  and  for  all  i  in  J,  B,  is  a  subset  of  S.  Let 
Let  9  be  the  u-algebra  generated  by  the  fmite  dimensional  rectangles.  Proposition  V.1.2  in 
[23]  shows  that  there  exists  a  probability  over  (S  N,  99)  such  that  for  all  J-dimensional 
rectangles,  B,  p(B)  =  p,(B). 
lo  Let  X-=x  (i)  x,(i).  Then,  {X,}  is  a  sequence  of  independent  random  variables  with  finite 
variance,  ,‘,.  Fkthermore,  xF=,  (o,/i2)  <  co,  and  thus  by  the  Kolmogorov’s  law  of  large  num- 
bers  (see  for  instance  [27,  Theorem  6,  p.  60]),  lim,,  ~  (l/7)  CT=,  X,  =  p,p#.  (almost  surely). DYNAMICAL  SYSTEMS  AND  RANDOM  MATCHING  487 
where  a:,(i)  <  &(i  +  1).  For  any  two  different  types  s, and  S, let 
if i is odd, 
if i is even; 
a~(afo(i))  =  azr(i), 
Clearly  if  x E X,,  then  0:  E C. 
if  r #  u. 
Let  cr,: X,  -+ Z  be such  that  a,(x)  =  a:.  The  function  (T, is injective  since 
a~cT;=x. 
Next  we construct  two  different  probability  spaces for  matches.  In  the 
first  probability  space the  events  “individual  i is matched  with  individual  j” 
and  “individual  i is  matched  with  individual  k”  are  not  equally  likely.  The 
second  probability  space is the  coarsest  for  which  each  subpopulation  I,(E) 
is  matched  with  the  population  average.  Note  that  for  this  second  proba- 
bility  space  the  event  “individual  i  is  matched  with  individual  j”  are  not 
measurable.  i ’ 
Since  (T, is injective,  by  identifying  x  and  a:  we can construct  a probabil- 
ity  over  .E‘, =  g,(X,).  Formally,  let  FE  be  the  a-algebra  generated  by 
a,(B’n  X,)  and  let  P,  =  ~00;  I.  Then,  (C,,  3$,  P,)  is  a probability  space. 
We  can  extend  this  probability  over  all  2  by  letting  9:  be the  a-algebra 
generated  by  55* and  Z\C,  and  letting  Pi(A)  = P,(A  n C,). 
THEOREM  1  (C, PA,  Pi)  is  a  probability  space for  which  the  event 
{(T E C 1  a(i)  = j}  is measurable. 
Proof  Let  By  be  the  event  “i  is  the  nth  player  of  type  a(i)  who  is 
matched  with  an  individual  of  type  a(j).”  Let  N,.=  (k<i)a(k)=a(i)}. 
Then 
B:‘=  u  (x  E SN 1  x(i)  = a(j),  Vk’ E N’,  x(k’)  = a(j), 
(N’cN,IIN’I=,1} 
and  Vk”E  N,\N’,  x(k”)  #a(j)}. 
Thus  By  is  the  finite  union  of rectangles  and  is  thus  measurable.  Similarly, 
let  By  be  the  event  ‘j  is  the  nth  player  of type  a(j)  who  is  matched  with 
an  individual  of type  a(i).”  Clearly,  BJ’ is measurable.  Let  B” =  BP n  B,’ and 
let  B=  Un<min(i,jb  B”.  Clearly,  B”  is  measurable  and  x E B  if  and  only  if 
6,  (x)(i)  =  j.  Therefore, 
o,(B)=  {aECIo(i)=j)EFA, 
and  thus  the  event  that  individual  i  is  matched  with  individual  j  is 
measurable.  1 
”  Recall  that  in  Section  3 we  showed  that  for  a  probability  space  over  ,r  either  the  events 
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The  random  matching  scheme  (Z,  .9”f,  Pi)  has  the  property  that  an 
individual,  i,  is more  likely  to  meet  an  individual  j,  when  this  individual  is 
nearby  (i.e.,  1  i -  jl  small),  and  less likely  to  meet  an  individual,  j,  when  this 
individual  is  far  away  (i.e.,  [i-j1  big).  We  define  a  random  matching 
scheme,  (&  k  a,  a ,  o-’  P*)  that  does  not  have  this  property  and  such  that  Pz 
and  PL  agree  on  9:.  In  order  to  do  this,  let  4,:  C -+  SN  be  defined  by 
4, (cr) =  CI  0 c  and  let  Y, =  4,  (Z).  Finally,  let  (SN,  B’,  p’)  be the  completion 
of the  space  (SN,  9?, ,B). 
LEMMA  1.  A’, c  Y,.  Consequently, p’( Y,)  =  1. 
Proof  Let  x E A’(U).  Then  a,(x)  EC  and  bM(a,(x))  =  x.  Therefore, 
x E Y(E).  Consequently,  $(  Y,)  =  1 since  A’, c  Y,  and  $(X,)  =  1.  1 
The  probability  measure  $  is  restricted  over  Y,  by  setting 
z?i9’,=sYn  Y,,  py(A)=p’(An  Y,). 
Let  5:  be  the  a-algebra  on  C  generated  by  b;‘(W,)  and  let  Pz  = ,u,,o ba. 
THEOREM  2.  (C, F,‘,  Pi)  is a probability  space. 
Proof  Follows  from  the  previous  lemma,  the  fact  that  p(X,)  =  1,  and 
Proposition  2.12  (p.  21)  in  [3]. 
For  either  probability  space we have  thus  proven  the  following  theorem. 
THEOREM  3.  Let  Z,(a)  be the subset of the population of  type s,.  Suppose 
that  the proportion  of the population of  type s, is p”.  Suppose  that people are 
matched at  random according  to  the  matching  rule  (Z;  pa,  P,).  Then the 
proportion  of  the population  Z,(a)  that  is matched with  an individual of  type 
s, is pv  (almost surely). 
6.  EXTENSION  OF  THE  PROBABILITY  OF  THE 
REALIZATIONS  OF  MATCHES 
In  the  previous  section  we defined  a  probability  over  the  set of realiza- 
tions  of the  matching  process.  In  order  to  do  that  we had  to  assume  that 
the  assignment  of types,  u, was such that  the  Cesaro  average  converges;  i.e., 
u E A  where 
T 
A  =  a E SN  I !i,  f  .c  a(i)  exists  and  is  strictly  positive 
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In  this  section  we dispence  with  this  assumption;  i.e.,  we define  a probabil- 
ity  over  the  realization  of matches  for  all  a E SN.  This  is done  by  means  of 
a  measurable  extension  of the  averaging  which  we denote  by  g. 
In  order  to  prove  the  existence  of a measurable  extension  we need  both 
a  topological  and  a measurable  structure  for  SN.  The  space SN  is endowed 
with  the  product  topology;  this  makes  SN  a  complete,  separable,  metric 
space I2  and  (SN,  28) a measurable  space where  g  is  the  Bore1  o-algebra. 
Let  G: SN  -+ R”  be  such  that  for  all  tl~  SN,  G(a)  is  the  set  of  cluster 
points  of a;  i.e., 
Tn 
such  that  ,,l\rnm $  ,C  u(i)  =  a 
n1=1 
Note  that  since  ((l,/T)~iT_,  a(i))...  is  an  infinite  sequence  belonging  to 
the  m-dimensional  simplex  it  has  a convergent  subsequence  and  thus  G(a) 
is nonempty. 
LEMMA  2.  The  correspondence  G  is  closed-valued  and  measurable. 
Proof.  Fix  a E SN,  let  {am},  be such  that  am E G(a)  and  am +  a. For  all 
m E N,  let  { Tr}”  be  such  that 
For  each  m EN,  let  n(m)  be such  that 
II 
+  TfJ’u(i)-tzmil  <  l/m 
n(m)  i=l 
and  n(m)  >  n(m  -  1). 
Then  it  is  each  to  check  that  lim,,  cu (l/T”  ) CUT)  u(i)  =  a.  Therefore,  n(m)  1 
a E G(M)  and  G(a)  is closed. 
Let  Fc  R”  be closed.  Then, 
G-‘(F)=  {o&~~IG(Lx)~F#~~/) 
=  ct~S~(3{T,,},  such  thatnl\mW$,2a(i)EF 
“r=l 
I2 One  possible  metric  is  d,  where  for  all  a,  p  E SN, 
d(a,  B)=  c  la(i)-H4l 
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and 
aER”‘I!lbEFsuch  that  Ilrr-hli<k 
Since  for  all  T and  n,  F,,  E g’,  G-  ‘(F)  E ?8 and  G  is measurable.  1 
LEMMA  3.  The correspondence  G has a measurable  selection g. 
Proof:  The  Kuratowski-Ryll-Nordziewski  Theorem  (see  for  instance 
Theorem  14.2.1  in  [20])  states  that  any  closed-valued  B-measurable 
correspondence  into  a complete  separable  metric  space has a g-measurable 
selection.  Thus  the  result  follows  from  Lemma  2.  1 
Note  that  for  all  a E A,  g(a)  =  lim.,  a  (l/T)  C,‘_  i tx(i)  and  thus  g  is  the 
extension  we are  looking  for. 
Let  B be  a  finite  measurable  rectangle  in  SN;  i.e., 
B =  {x  E SN  1  x(i)  E Bi for  all  i in  J}, 
where  JC  N  is a  finite  set and  for  all  i in  J,  Bjc  S. Then  let  p(c(, B)  be the 
probability  that  if the  type  of each  individual  is given  by  a, then  for  all  i E .I, 
individual  i is  matched  with  an  individual  of type  B,;  i.e., 
Aa,  B)  =  n  (  c  n,(a)). 
icJ  SE  6, 
The  function  ~(cY,.  )  can  clearly  be  extended  so  that  (SN,  a,  ~(cc,. ))  is  a 
probability  space. 
LEMMA  4.  The function  p  is a stochastic kernel. 
Proof  In  order  to  check  the  measurability  of ,u( ., B)  it  is  sufficient  to 
consider  the  case where  B is a finite  dimensional  rectangle  [23,  p. 751.  For 
this  case,  p(  . , B)  is  clearly  a  continuous  function  of  g(a).  Therefore, 
pL(  ., B)  is  a measurable  function.  1 
7.  REPEATED  MATCHING  SCHEME 
In  this  section  we define  the  notation  to  describe  a  population  which  is 
matched  inlinitely  many  times,  and  in  which  after  each  period  individuals’ 
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that  even  if we start  with  an  assignment  of types  in  the  population  that  has 
a  Cesaro  average,  the  updating  of individuals’  types  can  be  such  that  the 
new assignment  of types  does  not  have  a Cesaro  average.  In  the  previous 
section  we showed  that  we could  define  a random  matching  scheme  for  this 
case. In  this  section  we show that  the  random  matching  scheme  is such  that 
in  every  period  the  assignment  of  types  has  a  Cesaro  average  (almost 
surely). 
Let  T: S x S-,  S  be  such  that  if  at  time  t  an  individual  of  type  s,, is 
matched  with  an  individual  of type  s,. then  at  time  t +  1 the  individual  is 
of  type  T(L  ~1.  I3  In  order  to  g uarantee  that  no  type  disappears 
immediately  we  assume  that  for  all  types  s,  there  exist  types  s,  and  s,, 
(where  r,  u,  w  can  be  equal)  such  that  T(s,,  s,.) =  S,E  S.  Let 
t:SNxSN+SN  be  such  that  for  all  in  N,  x, c1  E SN, 
t(x,  Lx)(i) =  T(tx(i),  x(i)).  I4 
If  at  time  t  individual  i  is  of  type  a(i)  and  is  matched  with  an  individual 
of  type  x(i)  then,  at  time  t +  1,  individual  i’s  type  is  ~(GI,  x)(i).  For  all 
XESN  and  for  ail  CI E SN,  the  functions  t:SNx{x)+.sN  and 
t:  {a}  x SN  +  SN  are  continuous  I5  (and  thus  measurable)  and  hence 
jointly  measurable.  I6 
I3 Note  that  this  law  of  motion  includes  the  one  considered  in  Section  2,  where 
T(S,,  S,)  = 
SC  if  n,,.#O 
Sk  if  a,,  =O. 
The  results  in  this  paper  show  that  if  the  population  is  countably  intinite  then  Eq.  (1) 
describes  the  behavior  of  the  process  (almost  surely). 
A  more  general  model  would  allow  for  a  stochastic  law  of  motion;  i.e., 
where  r  is  measurable  and  (S,  Y(S))  and  ([0,  I],  &I(  [0,  I]))  are  measurable  spaces  (where 
B(S)  is  the  power  set  and  &I(S)  is  the  Bore1  o-algebra).  The  map  becomes  stochastic  after  we 
deline  a  probability  over  the  measurable  space  ([0,  I],  @(  [0,  11)). 
I4  If  T  is  stochastic  then  t:  SN  x  SN  x  [O.  llN  -+  A  is  such  that  for  all  in  N,  X,  CLE SN, 
5E10, IIN. 
t(x, a, t)(i) = da(i), x(i), 5J 
Is Suppose  a”  +  a  and  let  m  >  0.  Then  there  exists  an  N  such  that  for  all  n >  N  and  for  all 
i <  m,  a”(i)  =  a(i).  Thus  for  all  n  >  N  and  for  all  i<  m,  t(a”,  x)(i)  =  [(a,  x)(i).  Therefore, 
r(a”,  x)  ---t t(a, x)  and  f(  .,  x)  is  continuous.  The  same  proof  shows  that  t(a,  .)  is  continuous. 
i6The  proof  that  the  continuity  of  each  section  implies  joint  measurability  is  in  the 
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Let  Z=SNxSN  and  let  V=W@9?.  Let  Q:Zx%+[O,  l]  be  such  that 
for  all  (c(, X) E Z  and  ail  (B,  B’) E V, 
Q((u, xl,  (B, B’))  = xe(f(a,  x))  pL(f(a, xl,  B’). ” 
Q((M,  x),  (a’,  x’))  is  the  probability  that  if  at  time  t  the  population  has 
types  assigned  by  c1  and  is  matched  according  to  x,  then  at  time  t +  1 the 
population  has  types  assigned  by  U’  and  is matched  according  to  x’. 
LEMMA  5.  The function  Q  is a transition probability,  i.e., for  each C E g, 
Q( ., C)  is measurable  and for  each z E Z,  Q(z,.)  is a probability  measure. 
Proof.  Fix  z E Z.  Then  Q(z,  .)  is  the  product  of  two  probability 
measures  and  is thus  a  probability.  Fix  C =  (B, B’) E V.  Note  that  Q( ., C) 
is  the  product  of two  measurable  functions  of t and  that  t is  a measurable 
function  of z. Therefore,  Q( ., C)  is  a measurable  function.  1 
The  Ionescu-Tulcea  theorem  (see for  instance  [ 23,  Proposition  V. 1.11) 
states  that  if  { (E,,  9J}  is  an  infinite  sequence  of measurable  spaces and  if 
P~G;~ is  a transition  probability  defined  with  respect  to  the  spaces 
( 
I  I 
X  Es,  0  E  and  (E,+l,%+lh 
s  = 0  s=O  > 
then  there  exists  a unique  probability,  P,,,  on 
whose  value  for  every  measurable  rectangle  Xf=  i I;,  XF!  T+,  ES is given  by 
.  .  .  I 
P~.-T~l(xO...xT~,;dxT). 
FT 
Let  Z=XnsN  Z  and  S??= BnsN  W. Then  the  Ionescu-Tulcea  theorem  in 
conjunction  with  Lemma  5 gives  the  following  result. 
I’ For  the  case  where  r  is  stochastic  let  Iz  be  the  Lebesgue  space  over  [0,  llN.  For  all 
a, x E SN, let  P.,~ be  the  probability  measure  on  (SN, $3’) defined  by 
Then, 
Q((u,  XL (B, B’)) = j/U,  B’) dp,.(r). DYNAMICAL  SYSTEMS  AND  RANDOM  MATCHING  493 
-  - 
THEOREM  4.  There is a unique probability  Q,  over  (Z,  W) such that for 
every finite  dimensional rectangle, C’, x  . . .  x  C,X,“,  J+ , SN, 
Just  as  in  section  Section  5,  let  X,  be  the  set  of  realizations  of  the 
matching  rule  such  that  each  subpopulation  is  matched  with  the 
population  average.  By  the  results  in  Section  5,  for  all  c1  E A,  ~(cl, X,)  =  1. 
LEMMA  6.  The  correspondence X:  A  +  SN  is  measurable and  closed 
valued. 
Proof:  The  proof  is exactly  the  same  as the  proof  of Lemma  2.  1 
LEMMA  7.  The graph  of  X  is measurable. 
Proof.  The  graph  of  a  closed  measurable  function  is  measurable  (see 
[20,  Proposition  13.2.2  and  Proposition  13.2.4]),  thus  this  result  follows 
directly  from  Lemma  6.  1 
THEOREM  5.  Suppose that  the initial population’s types are described by 
Q  E A  and  the population  is matched according  to  x0 E X,,.  Then at  every 
period  the assignment  of  types has a Cesaro average and each subpopulation 
is matched with  the population  average (almost surely). 
Proof  Let  C =  graph  X  and  let  z E C.  Clearly,  x,,;,(t(z))  =  1 and  by  the 
results  in  Section  4,  u(t(z),  A’,,=,)=  1.  Then  since  t(z)E  A  we  get  that 
(t(z),  X1,=)) E graph  X  and  thus, 
Qk  Cl  2  Qk  (t(z),  x,c,,))  =  x,Jt(z))  At(z),  J’t(.-J  =  1. I8 
Since  for  all  z E C,  Q(z,  C) =  1, then  for  all  JE  N, 
a,[  cx..-xc  i  z 
n=J+l  1 
=  =Q( 
5  zo, z,;  dz,)... 
I  Q(zJ-  1, zJ;  dz,)=  1.  1 
C 
‘s In  order  to  prove  that  Q(z,  C)  =  1 we had  to  show  that  C was measurable.  An  alternative 
way  of  proving  the  same  results  is  to  show  that  the  set  C  is  fhick  (i.e.,  A  EV, 
An  C=  0=+  P(A)  =0)  and  thus  &x,  C)=  1, where  0  is the  extension  of Q  over  the  trace 
o-algebra  U(U)  such  that  &A  n  C) =  Q(A)  (see  [26,  p. 15, Theorem  51). 494  RICHARDT.BOYLAN 
Since  in  each  period  each  subpopulation  is matched  with  the  population 
average,  given  an  initial  population,  a,  we can  compute  the  distribution  of 
types  at  any  given  period  t,  g’(a).  Specifically,  by  letting 
and  we define  recursively  g’(a)  by 
g’(a) = g’-‘k’(a)). 
Next  we  want  to  show  that  the  probability  Qz,  is  generated  by  some 
probability  space  over  the  set of matches. 
Let  4:  ,EN x AN  +  Z  be  such  that 
4(fa,),  {a,))=  {(aio~i,  aJ1. 
-  -,  Let  Y=  &C”  x AN)  and  let  (Z,  %’ , Q’)  be  the  completion  of  the  space 
-  -,  (Z,  V,  &).  Using  the  same  arguments  as in  Lemma  1 we can  show that 
graph  Xc  Y and  thus  Q’(Y)  =  1. The  probability  Q’  is restricted  over  Y by 
setting 
%y=%n  Y  and  QdC)=  Q’(Cn  Y). 
Let  B  be  the  o-algebra  generated  by  qf~  - ‘(%?r) and  let  P =  Q ,,n 4.  Using 
the  same  argument  as in  Section  4  we get  the  following  result. 
THEOREM  6.  (LNxA  N, F  P)  is a probability  space.  , 
In  many  applications  we will  not  be  interested  in  the  actual  matches  but 
only  in  the  evolution  of the  population.  Let  v: SN  x B  +  [0,  l]  be such that 
for  all  aeSN  and  BECS, 
v(a,  B) = Aa,  t;‘(B)). 
For  all  a, a’ E SN,  v(a,  a’)  is  the  probability  that  if at  time  t the  popula- 
tion’s  types  are  described  by  a,  then  at  time  t +  1 the  population’s  types  are 
assigned  by  a’. Futia  [ 12,  Theorem  6.21  proves  the  following  result. 
LEMMA  8.  The function  v  is a transition probability;  i.e., for  each BE C-k?, 
v( ‘, B)  is measurable and for  each a E SN, v(a, .)  is a probability. 
Let  S=XnEN  SN  and  B=  ansN  93’. Then,  the  Ionescu-Tulcea  theorem 
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THEOREM  7.  There  is a  unique probability  5,  on  (3,  a)  such that for 
every finite  dimensional  rectangle, B,  x  . .  x  B,  Xnms  J + , SN, 
FE0 
[ 
B,x  ...  xB,  i  SN 
fl=J+  I  1 
=j  v(ao,a,;da,)...  I 
“(a,-  I,  ccJ;  da,). 
BI  BJ 
COROLLARY  1.  Zfcq,EA  then v,,[A”]=  1. 
Proof  Follows  since  we showed  in  Section  4 that  v(c(,,, A) =  1.  1 
8.  MATCHING  SCHEMES  THAT  Do  NOT  DEPEND 
ON  INDIVIDUAL'S  TYPES 
Suppose  there  are  finitely  many  individuals.  We  represent  individuals  as 
balls,  where  the  color  of the  ball  represents  the  type  of the  individual.  The 
random  matching  scheme  is given  by  drawing  balls  from  an  urn,  two  at  a 
time  and  without  replacement.  In  the  first  subsection  we prove  that  if the 
urn  is  large,  the  probability  with  which  the  pairings  behave  according  to 
expectation  is  high.  In  the  second  subsection  and  the  third  subsection  we 
use  this  result  to  characterize  a  random  matching  scheme  for  finite  and 
infinite  populations. 
8.1.  Some Urn  Results 
An  urn  contains  R red  balls  and  B blue  balls.  2b balls  are  drawn  in  pairs 
from  the  urn  without  replacement  (where  2b <  R +  B).  Let  Z, be  the  ran- 
dom  variable  which  equals  1 if the jth  pair  drawn  is  {red,  red}  and  equals 
0  otherwise.  Let  X  be  the  random  variable  that  denotes  the  number  of 
{red,  red)  pairs  drawn;  i.e., 
x=  i  I,. 
/=I 
Then  the  expected  value  of  X,  E(X),  is  computed  by  using  the 
exchangeability  of the  random  variable  I,. 
E(X)=  2  P[jth  pair  is  {red,  red}] 
j=  1 
=  bP[lst  pair  is  {red,  red}] 
R  =b-  R-l 
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Next  we compute  the  variance  of X,  V(X). 
E(X(X-  l))=  E  c  rizi 
(  )  if  ; 
=  i;j  P[ith  pair  is  {red,  red}  and jth  pair  is  {red,  red}] 
=b(b-  l)P[lst  pair  is  {red,  red} 
and  2 nd  pair  is  {red,  red}  ] 
=b(b-  l)R 
R-l  R-2  R-3 
R+BR+B-1R+B-2R+B-3’ 
(First  equality:  definition  of  expectation;  second  equality:  algebra;  third 
equality:  exchangeability.)  Then, 
V(X)  =  [E(X2)  -E(X)]  +  E(X)  -  [E(X)]‘. 
Let  N  be  the  total  number  of  balls  and  let  R  =  pN,  B =  (1 -  p)  N.  Let 
2bN  be  the  number  of balls  drawn  when  there  are  N  balls  in  the  urn.  Let 
XN  be  the  random  variable  which  denotes  the  number  of  {red,  redjpairs 
drawn  when  there  are  N  balls  in  the  urn  and  2bN  balls  are  drawn.  Let  N 
be  very  large  so  that  the  terms  (N-l),  (N-2),  .  .  .  . (pN-3)  can  be 
approximated  by,  respectively,  N,  N,  .  .  .  . pN.  Then, 
+ bN(zW2  (bN12  @NJ4 
N2  -  N4  1 
=$[(b”-1)p4+p2-bNp4] 
=&?(l-p2). 
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Suppose  bN  +  co  as  N  +  co. Then,  ( l/bN)  XN  converges  in  probability  to 
p*.  Similarly  the  proportion  of  {blue,  blue}  pairs  converges  in  probability 
to  (1 -  p)*  and  the  proportion  of  {blue,  red}  pairs  converges  in  probability 
to  Zp( 1 -  p).  Suppose  an  urn  contains  balls  of type  si,  .  .  .  . s,  in  proportion 
PIT .  .  .  . p,.  If  we label  the  balls  of type  s, “red,”  by  the  above  result  we get 
that  the  frequence  of  {s,,  s,}  pairs  approaches  pp.  If  we label  the  balls  of 
type  s,  and  s,  “red,”  the  frequency  of  pairs  is,,  s,},  (s,,  s,},  (s,,  s,} 
approaches  (p,  +  p,)‘.  Since  we know  that  the  frequency  of  {s,,  s,}  and 
{s,,  s,}  pairs  approaches  pf  + pi,  then  the  frequency  of pairs  (s,,  s,}  must 
approach  2p, A. 
PROPOSITION  7.  As the size of  the urn goes to  infinity  the proportion  of 
(s,, s,) pairs converges  in probability  to  2p,p,. 
8.2. A  Matching  Scheme for  Finite  Populations  and  Finite  Number  of 
Periods 
A  justification  of  the  analysis  of  the  deterministic  model  for  a  finite 
population  is  that  the  modeler  is just  interested  in  examining  the  law of 
motion  for  a  finite  number  of  periods,  T,  and  that  for  a  large  enough 
population  the  deterministic  model  is  a  good  approximation  of  the 
stochastic  model.  This  section  proves  this  conjecture. 
Let  p:  be the  expected  proportion  of individuals  of type  s, at  time  t. The 
initial  proportion  p”  is given  while  the  other  proportions  are  computed  by 
assuming  that  each  type  is  matched  with  the  population  average.  If  the 
population  size  is  N,  the  population  is  denoted  by  P(N),  where 
P(N)  =  { 1, .  .  .  . N}.  For  any  period  t =  1, .  .  .  . T,  let  ~1’: P(N)  -+  S  denote  the 
assignment  of  types  in  the  population.  The  initial  population  a0  is  given 
while  the  populations  in  the  other  periods  are  obtained  by  the  law  of 
motion  r  (which  is  described  in  Section  7)  and  the  matching  rule.  The 
matching  scheme  is  the  following:  individuals  are  represented  by  balls  in 
an  urn  which  are  drawn  pairwise  without  replacement.  Individuals 
drawn  simultaneously  are  matched  to  one  another.  As  usual  a  match  is 
represented  by  0. 
THEOREM  8.  Consider the random matching scheme  we  just  defined. Then 
for  any  T > 0, E  > 0 and for  any  6 > 0 there exists a positive  integer N’ such 
that for  all population  sizes  N > N’  and all types s, the following  hoUs: with 
probability  greater  than 1 -  6, the proportion  of the population P(N)  of  type 
s, at  time  T,  (l/N)  xi”=,  a:(i),  is within  E of pr. 
Proof:  The  idea  behind  the  proof  is  the  following.  We  find  a  lower 
bound  for  the  proportion  of the  population  which  is matched  according  to 
the  population  average  in  every  period  (with  probability  1 -  v). The  lower 
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bound  and  1 -  v can  be  made  arbitrarily  close  to  1 by  taking  the  popula- 
tion  to  be  large  enough.  This  allows  us  to  find  a  subpopulation  which 
behaves  exactly  according  to  the  deterministic  model.  Again  the  proportion 
of  the  population  in  this  subpopulation  can  be  made  arbitrarily  close  to 
one  by  taking  the  population  to  be  large  enough. 
Fix  T>O,  s>O,  and  6>0.  Let  t>O  be such  that  (1 -(.s/5))T>  l-s,  let 
v  be  such  that  (1 -v)‘>  l-6,  let  p =  min,,,.  TPb,  and  let  N  be  greater 
than  N’  where 
N,  = TC’m(m  - 1) 
26E2p4  _ 
From  the  results  in  the  previous  subsection  we know  that 
p 
(I 
Let  t =  (2&/t)  p2 and  replace  N  by  its  lower  bound  (for  the  moment  we do 
not  bother  with  the  term  (1 -  (E/[))~-  ’  in  N).  Then 
p 
(I 
P”PP$  c 
IE  P(N) 
%(i)%(O(i))  +’  d  v 
I  )  m(m-  1)’ 
Consequently, 
P  max  p”pz-i  C 
(  I  r, 0  lEP(N) 
a,(i)a,(f~(i))  >i_p’  <v. 
I  > 
Some  more  algebraic  manipulations  give 
p  maxI~~~~-(lIN)Ci,P(N)a,(i)a”(~(i))l<~  ,1-v. 
r,  ”  Pr  PC  >  5  ’ 
Thus  there  exists  a subpopulation,  P,,  such  that  for  all  r  and  o, 
PPP~=  1  a,(i)  a,(a(i)) 
is  PI 
and  )  P, 1  2  (1 -  (s/t))  N.  Since  subpopulation  P, is  matched  according  to 
expectations,  after  the  updating  of types,  the  distributions  of individuals  in 
population  P, is given  by  p’.  Note  also  that  since N’  has  a term  (1 -  (&/r)) 
which  we did  not  use in  computing  bounds,  population  P, is large  enough 
to  get  exactly  the  same  bounds  we computed  above.  Thus,  with  probability 
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individuals  are  matched  according  to  the  population  average,  and 
lP,l  >  (1 -(E/O)  IPll  >  (1 -  hw’  N. 
Consequently,  with  probability  greater  than  (1 -  v)~ >  1 -  6, the  propor- 
tion  of  individuals  matched  according  to  the  correct  proportions  is 
(1 -  (E/{))~>  1 -  E, which  gives  the  desired  result.  1 
8.3.  A  Matching  Scheme  for  Infinite  Populations 
Let  k,  4: N  +  N  be defined  recursively  by  k(  1) =  2, 4(n)  =  Cr=,  k(i),  and 
k(n)  =  mj(n  -  1).  For  all  i E N,  let 
U, = {4(n  -  I),  i(n  -  1) + 1, .  .  .  . 4(n)}; 
D,  =  {d:  U,  -+  U,  1  d is  bijective  and  for  all  i E N, 
d(i)  #  i and  d’(i)  =  i}. 
(Here  U  stands  for  “urn,”  D  stands  for  “draws,”  k(n)  is  the  number  of 
individuals  in  urn  n,  d(n)  is the  number  of individuals  in  all  the  urns  up  to 
urn  n.)  Let  53” =  2O’  and  for  all  D  E 9,,,  let 
Clearly,  (Di,  gi,  Pi)  is  a  probability  space.  Let  D=  X,zi  D,,  let 
$3 =  02  I  g;,  and  let  P=  I’Jz  1 Pi.  Then  by  the  definition  of  product 
probability,  (D,  9,  P)  is a probability  space. Let  de  D;  then  d(i)  =  j  stands 
for  “individual  i is  matched  with  individual  j.”  P(d)  denotes  the  probability 
with  which  the  match  d  occurs. 
Let  S=  {sr,  .  .  .  . s,}  where  we identify  S, with  the  m  dimensional  vector 
with  1 on  the  rth  component  and  0 on  the  other  components.  Let  a: N  -+ S 
be  such  that  lim  ,,,+ m (l/N)  C,“_,  cc(i) =  p.  Note  that  in  the  limit,  the 
average  type  in  an  urn  is  the  same  as in  the  population  at  large;  i.e., 
lim  1  2  u(i)=p. 
n -  10  k(n)  ie  Z/(H) 
By  the  result  in  Section  8.1  (where  bN G  N), 
(Vk>O)  lim  P 
n-m  [I 
~i~F,..,r.(i)4(n(i))-p:l>k]=0. 
Let  &l(n)  =  max{  ie  N  I&i)  <n}.  Note  that  by  the  construction  of U(n) 
and  the  results  in  the  previous  section  that 500  RICHARD  T.BOYLAN 
iim  E 
n-m 
k  ,i  a,(i)~I~(a(i)) 
r=l  1 
:P  7.  a,(i)  4(@(i))  =  lim  f 
n + c0  Ln  ie U(Fl(n)) 
+’  i  a,(i)  4(4i)) 
n.  I=(c&‘(n))+l  1 




Furthermore,  since  the  draws  in 
in  other  urns, 
one  urn  are  independent  from  the  draws 
a,(i)  4(di)) 
+1  f:  a,(i)  4(44)  n. 
r=qq+-‘(n))+l  1 
=  lim  n-m  k(l!l(n))  y4Jny  P,2(1-  Pf) 
1 
+ 
n-‘&#-‘(n))  -  1  * 
n-4(&‘(n))-  1  n  Pf(l-  P3 
= 0. 
Thus  by  Chebychev’s  inequality  we get  the  following  theorem. 
THEOREM  9.  (l/n)  XI=  1  a,(i)  &(a(  i))  converges  in probability  to p:. 
By  the  same  reasoning  than  the  one  in  the  last  paragraph  of Section  9.1 
we get  the  following  corollary. 
COROLLARY  2.  (l/n)C;=r  ff,(i)d,(a(i))  converges  in probability  to p,pV. 
9.  CONCLUSION 
Biologists  and  economists  have  analyzed  populations  where  each 
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matching  generates  a  very  complicated  stochastic  system.  Consequently 
biologists  and  economists  have  approximated  such  a  system  with  a  deter- 
ministic  system.  The  justification  for  such  an  approximation  is  that  the 
population  is assumed  to  be very  large  and  thus  some  law of large  numbers 
must  hold.  In  the  paper  we give  an example  for  which  this  assumption  does 
not  hold.  This  does  not  mean  that  this  kind  of approximation  may  never 
hold,  but  that  the  correctness  of the  approximation  depends  on  properties 
of the  law of motion. 
This  paper  gives  a  characterization  of  random  matching  schemes  for 
countably  infinite  populations.  In  particular  this  paper  shows  that  there 
exists  a  random  matching  scheme  such  that  the  stochastic  system  and  the 
deterministic  system  are  the  same.  Economists  and  biologists  have  assumed 
that  the  probability  with  which  an  individual  is  matched  with  a particular 
subpopulation  equals  the  proportion  of the  population  in  that  subpopula- 
tion.  This  paper  shows  that,  for  a  countable  population,  this  is  possible 
only  if the  random  matching  scheme  depends  on  the  assignment  of types  in 
the  population. 
The  problem  described  in  the  previous  paragraph  arises  only  if  we are 
interested  in  infinite  populations.  If  we examine  the  behavior  of the  process 
for  finitely  many  periods,  we  conclude  that  if  the  population  is  large 
enough,  then  there  is  a  matching  scheme  such  that  the  deterministic  pro- 
cess provides  a  good  approximation  of  the  stochastic  process.  In  proving 
this  result,  we provide  an  upper  bound  on  deviation  (Eq.  (3))  which  should 
be  useful  in  a variety  of applications  (in  simulations  of neural  networks,  for 
instance).  However,  if  we  consider  the  case  of finite  populations  and  an 
infinite  number  of  periods  we  may  run  into  problems  as  was  shown  in 
Section  2. 
APPENDIX 
The  following  lemmas  prove  Proposition  1. Let  A =  {p  E R:  1  p,  +  p2 + 
p3=l},&l={  P~Alp,P,p,=O},~,=(1,0,O),u*=(0,1,O),~,=(0,0,1). 
Let  pO E A \aA  be  the  initial  population,  let  p’  =  R’p’,  and  let  o  be  the  set 
of accumulation  points  of the  orbit  {p’}. 
LEMMA  9.  The set of  accumulation points is a subset of  the boundary. 
Proof.  Suppose  p  is an  accumulation  point  which  is  not  on  the  bound- 
ary  of  the  simplex;  i.e.,  p~co\aA.  Weising  [32]  proves  that  the  function 
W(p)  =  (l/p,  p2p3) is  strictly  increasing  along  any  trajectory.  Thus  all  con- 
vergent  subsequences  must  converge  to  a point  on  the  set L c  W -‘(  W(p)). 
Note  that  by  the  properties  of  limit  sets  R(L)  =  L  but  that  for  each 502  RICHARD  T.BOYLAN 
YE R(L)  and  ZE L,  we  have  W(y)  >  W(z),  which  is  clearly  a  contra- 
diction.  m 
LEMMA  10.  The set of  accumulation points includes the three vertices. 
Proof  Since  A  is  compact,  the  set  of  accumulation  points,  o,  is 
nonempty. 
We  first  show that  the  set  of accumulation  points  includes  at  least  one 
vertex.  Suppose  p  is  a limit  point  (thus  a  point  on  a  boundary)  which  is 
not  a  vertex  and  let  the  subsequence  {t,,]  be  such  that  lim,,  o. p’” = p. 
Without  loss  of  generality  suppose  that  p E {YE  A 1  y,  =  0).  Note  that 
lim,  + m  R”(p)  =  v2.  Thus  the  subsequence  (p’n’“}  is  such  that 
lim,,  3?  ~‘n+~=  v2. 
Note  that  if p  is such  that  p l =  0  and  p2 p3 >  0,  then  for  any  E >  0  there 
is  a large  enough  N  such  that  IpN -  v31 <E.  Since  R”  is  continuous,  if pf  is 
close  enough  to  p  then  Ip’ + N  -  v3( <  E. Consequently  vj  is an  accumulation 
point.  Similarly  we can  show that  v1 E o.  1 
LEMMA  11.  The set of  accumulation points is infinite. 
Proof.  Let  B(u,,  E) be the  open  ball  of radius  E around  vi;  i.e.,  B(u,,  E) = 
{PEAI  IP-vii  <E}.  S ince  R  is  continuous  and  R(ui) =  v,,  there  exists  a 
scalar  .s>O  such  that  if  i#j  then  R(B(v,,  &))nB(vj,  &)=a.  Since  the  ver- 
tices  are  accumulation  points  of  the  trajectory  {p’},  then  P’E B(vi,  E) for 
infinitely  many  integers  t.  Thus  for  infinitely  many  t, ~‘EZE  A\ui  B(vi,  E). 
Since  the  set  Z is compact,  there  exists  a subsequence  converging  to  p E I. 
Thus  p E o\ui  vi.  Then  for  all  t,  R*p E o  and  for  all  t #s,  R’p # R”p  (since 
W  is strictly  increasing  on  R’p).  1 
The  following  theorem  is used  in  Section  7. 
THEOREM  10.  Let  (X,  99) be a  measure space where X  is a  separable 
complete metric and ~43  is the Bore1 u-algebra. Let f:  Xx  X  -+ X  be such that 
for  all  x  E X,  f:  {x}  x  X  +  X  and f:  Xx  {x}  -+ X  are continuous. Then f  is 
measurable. 
Proof  Since  X  is  a  separable  metric  space,  the  Bore1  a-algebra  @  has 
a  denumerable  subfamily,  9  generating  33  (see  for  instance  [24, 
Theorem  1.81).  Let 
LS=  {D,,  . .  .  . D,,  .  .  .  .  }. 
Let 
F”={F,nF,n  ...  nF,,Iwhere  Fi=Dior  Fi=X\Di} 
=  {F;,  .  .  .  . F”,,,,,  > DYNAMICAL  SYSTEMS  AND  RANDOM  MATCHING  503 
Note  that  9”  is  a  partition  of X  and  that  Yn c  93’. For  all  i  and  n choose 
y;  such  that  y:  E Fy.  Finally,  let 
m(n) 
f,(x,  Yf  =  1  fc?  Yl)  xxx  Fy. 
r=l 
Note  that  the  continuity  off:  Xx  {c}  -+ X  easily  implies  the  continuity  of 
the  function  g:  Xx  A’-+  X,  where  g(x,  y) =f(x,  c).  Thus  fn(x,  y)  is  a 
measurable  function.  Fix  YEX  and  for  all  12  let  i(n)  be  such  that  YE  F:,,,. 
Note  that  F:(,,  c  F$yi  ,) and  that  Fyc,, 1 { y >. Then, 
lim  fn(x,  Y)  =  lim  f(4  y&J  =fk  h-t  Y:&,)  =.0x,  y).  n -  ‘02  n-  xc  n-x 
The  function  f  is  hence  the  pointwise  limit  of  a  sequence  of  measurable 
functions  and  is  thus  measurable.  1 
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